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Labor and management are important cogs in the
American capitalist machine. One cannot exist without the
other. However, good relations between labor and
management can be tenuous. When the desires of labor and
management are out of balance, the relationship can
deteriorate, sometimes resulting in violence. Such was the
case at the steel mills of the Republic Steel Corporation in
and around Youngstown, Ohio in 1937. Republic Steel was
not in the top tier of steel producers in 1937. Larger
companies, like United States Steel Corporation or
Bethlehem Steel operated more facilities and turned larger
profits than Republic Steel. Trying to keep pace with its
competitors, in the early months of 1937, Republic rejected
advances by labor organizers to unionize its employees.
Believing unionization would have an adverse effect on its
profit margin, the Youngstown mainstay’s steadfast
determination to remain union-less added pressure to an
increasingly tense situation. Labor unrest was growing
throughout the U.S. and Republic Steel experienced strikes
in other cities where they also operated. On the evening of
June 19, 1937, during a union demonstration at one of
Republic’s mills, violence struck Youngstown, Ohio.
Republic employees clashed with local police, sheriff’s
deputies, and company security causing two deaths and
scores of injuries. Republic’s northeastern Ohio facilities
were not the only locations of confrontation between labor
and management, but the confrontation there, which left
two people dead, illuminates the dangers of neglecting
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harmony between labor, management, and the local
community.
Since the financial success of both Republic’s labor
and management depended on a collegial relationship, the
devolving and embittered situation in which those involved
were willing to take each other’s lives was extraordinary.
People with, at best, a tangential interest in the outcome,
like law enforcement, felt empowered to use deadly force
against fellow citizens engaged in a financial dispute.
Republic’s leadership was not concerned with the welfare
of its employees, who were beaten and shot. Rather, they
were indifferent so long as a docile workforce could be
maintained. Attitudes about community, economics,
patriotism, and stewardship held by Republic’s leader Tom
M. Girdler hold the key to understanding the outbreak of
violence in Youngstown, Ohio during the sweltering
summer months of 1937.
Tom Girdler led the Republic Steel Corporation as
either its president or board chairman from 1929–1956.1 He
was a mechanical engineer by education, but his real talent
was management. His upbringing, training, and experience
evolved into a philosophy called Girdlerism—a version of
paternalism that rewarded loyalty and rugged individualism
and abhorred communism and unions. Under Girdler’s
leadership, Republic Steel resisted unionization far longer
than competitors in the steel industry.2
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Republic Steel was a so-called “Little Steel”
company—a moniker given to secondary companies that
did not command the same market share as firms like the
United States Steel Corporation or Bethlehem Steel.3 In the
years preceding 1937, labor groups at firms of various sizes
began to organize as company-sanctioned unions. Steel
companies allowed their employees to organize if they did
so as a company union. Company unions, outlawed today,
were groups of workers that met under the supervision of
their employers. Under this arrangement, workers were not
actually free to voice disagreement with the company nor
were they protected by a binding contract. These ‘unions’
allowed employees to feel like their concerns were being
addressed while simultaneously allowing companies to
exert influence and retain control over their workforce.4 In
1937, this balance shifted. A new, more aggressive
organization, the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) began to organize workers.5 The CIO organized
outside the workplace and its membership was open to
anyone who wanted to join. Steel companies hated this new
model of unionization because it removed power from
timeline/steelstrike1941/; Global Nonviolent Action Database, n.d.
“United States steelworkers strike for a contract and union recognition,
1937,” Global Nonviolent Action Database,
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management and transferred it to labor. However, the
writing was on the wall and in early 1937 the United States
Steel Corporation acquiesced and struck an agreement with
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), a CIO
entity. SWOC bargained for U.S. Steel’s employees and
won the contract without a strike.6 U.S. Steel’s history
involved clashes with labor before 1937 and its leadership
calculated that negotiation with labor was preferable to
more bloodshed. This new arrangement was problematic
for companies like Republic. It created a situation that
emboldened the CIO as it began to wield power. Republic,
and other companies, resisted the formation of noncompany unions and this resistance led to violence.
Labor Relations and Government Regulation, 1890–
1937
To understand violence across the Republic Steel
Corporation in 1937 it is necessary to examine U.S.
labor/management relations in the preceding decades.
During the late 1800s some American workers began to
agitate for better pay and working conditions. Improvement
for workers, however, came at a cost to employers. This
expense threatened profitability and workforce control. As
employees escalated demands, management turned to
private security firms to quell the boldness of labor. The
most famous private security organization was the
Pinkerton National Detective Agency. The Pinkertons, and
other groups like them, were accountable only to their
customers and operated as de facto police forces. They
were free to use coercion and violence to protect
management’s property and business interests. Workplace
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laws were nearly non-existent before 1900 and companies
took full advantage of notional regulation.7
A confrontation that exemplified companies’
bravado at the time occurred at Andrew Carnegie’s steel
mill in Homestead, Pennsylvania. Labor, represented by the
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers,
disagreed with management over wages and control.
Negotiation ensued, and an impasse was reached. During
this impasse management took a more aggressive stance
than usual. Instead of allowing work to continue, the
workforce was locked out and operations ceased. With this
tactic, management showed labor that it would suffer
without their benevolence. Henry Clay Frick, Carnegie’s
business partner and supervisor of Homestead, planned to
bring in non-union workers to restart operations. But the
workforce did something unexpected; it seized the mill by
force of arms. Frick responded by calling in the Pinkertons.
The next day, July 6th, 1892, the Pinkertons fought with
Homestead workers and townsfolk. The ensuing fight, in
which one side used a cannon, left 10 people dead: three
workers and seven Pinkertons. Six days later, the
Pennsylvania state militia was summoned to restore order.
For all the trouble, little changed. The confrontation
resolved none of the underlying issues and tensions
remained high until November when the union relented,
and some workers were allowed to return. Still other
laborers were blacklisted. Carnegie won—operations
resumed, and the workforce learned their place.8
7
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After the Homestead Strike, prevailing trends in
American business continued to favor capitalists over the
working class. The San Francisco streetcar strike of 1907
serves as yet another example, pitting United Railways
against employees represented by the Amalgamated
Association of Street and Electrical Railway Employees of
America, also known as the Carmen’s Union. The union
decided to strike when Patrick Calhoun, United Railways’
president, rejected a request to raise workers’ daily wage to
$3.00. Calhoun’s lawyer, James A. Farley, owned a
detective agency and was a professional strike buster.
Farley contracted 400 ruffians to travel from New York to
San Francisco to work the jobs that strikers left. These
hired hands stayed in one of the railcar storage barns, and
the union knew they were there. After waiting a day,
Calhoun ordered Farley’s men to operate six cars in
defiance of the union’s strike. Like the strikers before them,
they wore United Railways uniforms. Unlike the strikers,
Farley’s men worked armed with revolvers. Once the cars
left the barn, the strikers threw rocks and bricks at the
vehicles and the strikebreakers responded by firing on
them. Men remaining in the barn also opened fire on the
strikers. This event left 25 people mortally or seriously
wounded.9
In both of these important antecedents, corporate
leadership hired outside workers to intimidate workers with
the intent of breaking strikes. The message was clear—the
powerful capitalists running these companies would not
tolerate having the terms of their livelihoods dictated to
them. It was in management’s long-term economic interest
to refuse union demands. Had they not done so, they would
have willingly increased the legitimacy and bargaining
power of unions, threatening the order and discipline
needed to maximize profits. Furthermore, the Homestead
Strike involved governmental authorities in the form of the
9
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state militia arriving on scene. The militia were nominally
neutral, but their presence further intimidated the striking
steel workers, thus benefiting Carnegie’s position.
Government intervention in San Francisco, however,
benefited the strikers. Local police were displeased that
outside, private muscle came to their city agitating
violence. The police warned the newcomers that, “if any
strikebreakers start shooting from the cars, they will be shot
in return by the police.”10 Mismanagement from a lack of
direction produced decidedly different outcomes as
governmental leaders at each scene acted without guidance
telling them which side to support. State, and for that
matter national, legislatures failed to provide regulatory and
legal guidance to enforcement agencies in handling violent
or potentially violent labor disputes.
The early 1900s showed that the relationship
between labor and management was devolving to an
untenable situation. Carnegie’s use of the Pinkertons and
United Railways’ unleashing of Farley and his men were
catalysts for change. Laws that governed
labor/management relations and addressed wages and
working conditions were enacted because of incidents like
Homestead and San Francisco.
In 1935, labor scored a legislative victory with the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act, more
commonly referred to as the Wagner Act for its
namesake—New York Senator Robert R. Wagner. The
Wagner Act guaranteed the right of labor to organize and
bargain collectively, prohibited interference by
management, and established an independent board to
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administer the law.11 The Wagner Act was a departure from
previous judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act of
1890 which sought to ensure fair competition among
businesses. The Sherman Act required prohibition of
“…combinations or conspiracies in restraint of interstate or
foreign commerce and provided for criminal prosecution,
injunctions, and suits for triple damages for violations.”12
Congress designed the Sherman Act to protect the
American economy from monopolies by ensuring that one
company or trust could not become too powerful.
Corporations adapted by using the Sherman Act against
labor unions. They argued that because labor unions could
affect the flow of interstate commerce and its rates, they
conspired against organic fundamental operations and were
therefore in violation of the law. The Supreme Court
upheld this interpretation in Loewe v. Lawlor, also referred
to at the Danbury Hatters’ case.13 It appeared that workers’
rights were subservient to corporate profitability, at least in
the eyes of Congress and the federal judiciary. These
Sherman Act machinations occurred during the first decade
of the twentieth century. Labor unions and progressive
allies struggled for the following two decades to score a
major victory in their fight for rights until the passage of
the Wagner Act.
The Wagner Act was a sufficiently written law that
defined conditions precisely intended “to diminish the
causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate
and foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), and for other purposes.”14 This stipulation
11
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seemingly prioritized free-flowing commerce as the law’s
priority. However, the remainder of the law enumerated
rights and protections for labor that represented
reconciliation for decades of abuse suffered by American
workers at the hands of the United States’ industrial
management hegemony. Despite good intentions, the
Wagner Act was only partially effective at protecting
workforces from unfair labor practices. Because of cultural
norms, workers feared retribution by management. Local,
state, and federal authorities remained impotent in their
responses to labor/management disagreements even after
the Wagner Act’s passage. The Wagner Act was underenforced, and management continued to wield unchecked
power. Meaningful change did not occur until more blood
was shed, particularly during the Republic Steel
confrontation in Youngstown.
The Wagner Act specified that, “Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing…”15 This was the
most important text within the legislation as it established
legal protection for laborers. Prior to the Wagner Act,
employees were merely a commodity, but with its passage,
their wishes had to be considered. In addition to
recognizing labor as more than a tool of management, the
act also prohibited practices such as interference in union
activities, hiring discrimination based upon union
affiliation, and retribution by management.
Management viewed the new protections granted to
labor as unwelcome intrusions by the government into
private enterprise. After passing through Congress with
almost no opposition, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
15
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signed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) into law
on July 5th, 1935.16 Some saw this legislation as antiAmerican and patriarchal, resulting in immediate legal
challenges from private business. The new law established
workers’ rights and prohibitions of certain management
practices, and also established a National Labor Relations
Board to act as an enforcement body ensuring that violators
were sanctioned. However, before the board was organized
the American Liberty League—a conservative advocacy
group whose members opposed New Deal reforms
generally, and the Wagner Act specifically—questioned the
Wagner Act’s constitutionality in a scathing report that
suggested the new law placed excessive restriction on
individual rights. The Wagner Act was under attack and its
survival depended on the opinion of the Supreme Court.17
On April 12th, 1937, the Supreme Court held that
the Wagner Act was constitutional and provided “adequate
opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary
action.”18 With the Supreme Court’s endorsement, labor
began to influence American industry. Management did not
stand idly by, though, and allow their control to be usurped.
A response to widespread patterns of managerial behavior
that oppressed and dehumanized labor, the Wagner Act
provided the legislation required to stop the brazenness
with which employers treated their workers. Homestead,
San Francisco, and the struggle to pass the Wagner Act
served as prelude to violence in Youngstown in 1937.
Girdlerism
To understand violence throughout the Republic
Steel Corporation in 1937, it is imperative to understand
16
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Tom Girdler’s background. In many ways, Girdler was the
embodiment of that which business and capital tried to
protect. He believed in strength, patriotism, and
independence. He also eschewed the union ethos which
valued workers as vital and hard-to-replace partners in
industry’s success. Tom Girdler opposed the leadership of
the CIO literally and figuratively. Literally, in that he
ordered his employees to resist the formation of a union
and figuratively in that he personified the practices that
SWOC and the CIO tried to defeat.
Girdler gave his autobiography an ironic title: Boot
Straps. To pull oneself up by their bootstraps implies that
their road to success was within reach but required selfmotivation. In Girdler’s case, this could not have been
further from the truth. Two circumstances, his financial
well-being while attending college and his ascendency to
leadership of his father’s business, illustrate that Girdler’s
rise to industrial rule was assured. Girdler thus represented
the classic hypocritical industrialist who assumed hard
work was enough without realizing his own privilege.
Tom Girdler attended Lehigh University,
benefitting from the finances of his paternal aunt, Jenny.
Aunt Jenny believed education to be important and
promised to help Girdler attend college. His matriculation
began in 1897, studying mechanical engineering.
Beginning that year, Aunt Jenny saw to Girdler’s monthly
expenses. By the end of the first year, they agreed upon a
$50.00 monthly allowance. Girdler thrived at Lehigh. He
sang in a church choir, belonged to a fraternity and forged
strong friendships. One friend, Cy Roper, provided Girdler
an opportunity to work in England after graduation in 1901.
He worked for Roper in England for about a year, became
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homesick, and returned to the U.S. by March of 1902.19
Because of his time at Lehigh and his family’s
benevolence, Girdler achieved academically and expanded
his mind through travel. His family, via Aunt Jenny’s
stipend, provided him with the security that ensured an
undemanding path from adolescence to adulthood. Later in
life, during his time as chairman of the Republic Steel
Corporation, his employees fought for this same security
and Tom Girdler stood in their way.
During the summers of his college years, Girdler
worked in the family business. His father owned a cement
plant that did well, but production could be better. One
summer, Girdler’s father fell ill and needed to step back
from running the factory. The business’s treasurer, Thomas
Cooper, concocted a scenario in which Girdler would take
over the business. Girdler’s father was dubious. The elder
Girdler did not feel anyone beside him could run the
factory. Alas, needing a rest, he relented, and Tom Girdler
entered the world of management. Girdler described his
father as enslaved to duty. Tom wasn’t interested in
running a cement business, but he revered his father and his
way of life. Thus, duty compelled him to manage the
cement plant until his father could return. Girdler worked
relentlessly. During that summer, the cement plant broke
production records. While other men ate lunch, he worked.
When other men went home for the night, he worked.20
Girdler’s drive may have been due to his work ethic or it
may have been due to his idolization of his father. Either
way, he saw himself as driven and other men as lazy. This
attitude of self-righteousness dominated Girdler’s
interactions with labor for his entire career.
Girdler’s stance toward labor hardened when
attitude turned to action. Before running Republic Steel,
Tom M. Girdler, Boot Straps, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1943), 65–66, 83, 9.
20
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19
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Girdler spent time at various levels of management in other
companies. One of these firms was the Oliver Iron & Steel
Company. Early in his career, Girdler was a foreman for
Oliver. One day, one of his subordinates finished his work
and tried to leave a few minutes early, which was in
violation of company policy. Workers were expected to
start another task if it could be completed within a few
minutes after quitting time. Many workers were unhappy
with this rule and one man challenged it by leaving early.
Girdler ordered the man back to his post and when he did
not go Girdler punched the man and a fight ensued. Girdler
beat the man unconscious. After the incident, Girdler’s boss
was only concerned with who won the fight and fired the
worker.21 Girdler had only graduated college a year earlier
and was now a foreman, the lowest management position in
a steel mill. He knew that the worker’s actions were an
affront to his authority. This knowledge combined with his
inexperience resulted in a quicker escalation than
necessary. Girdler surmised that his place in the
labor/management ecosystem would be secure if he
protected the interests of capital. The man’s dismissal along
with Girdler’s continued ascension proved he was right.
This lesson, combined with his belief that labor was
inherently lazy, guided Girdler’s business decisions and
evolved into a management philosophy called Girdlerism.22
Intense control of labor through policies and practices that
21
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define the role of the worker as inferior characterized
Girdlerism. If labor did not try to re-define itself outside the
bounds of this definition, there was peace. When labor
upset the status quo, Girdlerism required management to
preserve its paternal role.
Violence that occurred at the Youngstown mill was
the result of Girdler’s unrelenting desire to maintain
control. When labor tried to organize, Republic only
allowed company unions. When labor persisted via SWOC,
Republic locked them out and slowed or stopped
production at its facilities. When labor called a strike,
Republic responded violently, and people were injured or
killed. Republic Steel, under the leadership of Tom Girdler
did not discriminate when it chose whom to apply the
principles of Girdlerism. Workers, women, and nonemployees were all targets on the night of June 19th, 1937.
Some believe that Girdlerism was a conscious set of policy
decisions, but it was not. Instead, Girdlerism was subconscious—a consequence of Girdler’s values and beliefs
that beset a company climate in his image. The managers of
Republic Steel shared a belief system rooted in vehement
control of labor to maintain a status-quo. Girdler attempted
to justify his philosophy by shrouding it in notions of
paternalism, patriotism, and capitalism.
While working for Jones and Loughlin, another
steel company, in 1914, Girdler managed a steel mill: the
Aliquippa Works at Woodlawn, Pennsylvania. There, he
rose to the rank of Assistant General Superintendent—the
highest position at Woodlawn.23 Later that same year, he
became head of Jones and Laughlin’s company town that
became Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. With Girdler as its leader,
Aliquippa became “…a benevolent dictatorship.”24 He
oversaw the town’s private police force and installed Harry
23
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Mauk, a former Pennsylvania state trooper, to lead it.
Girdler believed that his workers needed a paternalistic
figure to guide them. Aliquippa, a town with all its homes
owned by Jones and Loughlin and schools run likewise,
afforded Girdler the opportunity to be that father-figure and
control most areas of workers’ lives.25
Patriotism was another value that informed
Girdler’s leadership. Girdler described the United States’
advantage in World War II as follows, “all the superb
mechanisms which will enable them to conquer the
enemies of the United States are the products of this
country’s great industrial corporations and could only have
been created in such a short time by such organizations.”26
The American ideal and the determination of the United
States’ armed services took a backseat to industrialism for
Girdler. He felt a responsibility to provide military means
to defeat evil in the world. He also saw organized labor as a
threat to success in this endeavor. At the time, men with
communist leanings or were outright communists led the
CIO.27 Girdler equated the idea of workers’ rights to
communist sympathies. His version of patriotism would not
allow communists to defile his vision of the American way.
Thus, his rigid reaction to strikers in Youngstown was
consistent with his belief system. Boot Straps was
published in 1944, before both the end of the war and the
onset of the Cold War. Accordingly, those events only
reinforced his beliefs about communists, labor, and
business. Further, as one of the U.S.’s most prominent
captains of industry, Girdler was a chief architect of the
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nation’s attitude regarding communists, labor, and
business.
Girdlerism’s roots are embedded in capitalist
principles which prioritize profit above the well-being of
workers. One of the main criticisms of capitalism is that it
places excess wealth in the hands of too few people. One
must be willfully self-deceptive to engineer this lack of
balance into a business. Girdlerism was a tool used by
those who controlled wealth to maintain a lack of balance
and its inventor, Tom M. Girdler exercised it in its most
perfect form.
Youngstown, Niles, and Warren: Republic Steel’s Ohio
Battlefields in 1937
Violence erupted in Youngstown, Ohio on the
evening of June 19th, 1937 when striking union members
and agents for Republic Steel fought near Republic’s
facilities. This encounter was brutal and deadly; two people
died, and scores were badly injured. Several conditions
explain why events that day became bloody. First,
leadership of Republic Steel was determined not to bend to
the will of the CIO, acting through its steel industry
organizing arm, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee.
Second, SWOC, was determined to organize workers of
Republic Steel using new powers granted to it by the
Wagner Act. Third, local authorities were an invested third
party because events took place in their city, not only on
the grounds of Republic Steel. Finally, the attitudes of
those involved were rooted in their self-images as
Americans. Each believed their role legitimate and essential
to the functioning of the United States—all also believed
their opponents were wrong, misguided, or evil.
The CIO’s strike against Republic Steel began on
May 26th, 1937.28 Earlier that year, the organization sent a
28
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letter of demands that included a $5.00 daily minimum
wage, paid vacations, a 40-hour work week, overtime pay,
health and safety standards, and a grievances settlement
process.29 Tom Girdler was dumbstruck by the fact that his
workers wanted improvements in any of these areas but
particularly in safety. “Just ordinary carelessness, such as
management has engineered out of the industry, can cause
horrible accidents.” Girdler also suggested that although
management had virtually eliminated accidents, there were
“planned mishaps” concocted to coerce CIO membership.30
There was, however, enough employee unrest to enable
SWOC’s organizing efforts to take hold, but Girdler
refused to acknowledge their concerns. He refused the
demands of the CIO letter and did so because he believed
there was a faction of workers loyal to him. A large
majority of Republic’s employees joined the CIO, but some
did not. Girdler clung to the idea that these few were
virtuous while those who joined the CIO were
dishonorable. While pseudo-negotiations ensued, the group
of men that Girdler preferred met with another of the
company’s leaders, Charles White. Girdler claimed that, at
that meeting, they stated to White, “If Girdler signs an
agreement with the C.I.O., we strike!”31 This was music to
Girdler’s ears. In his mind, it gave him a moral justification
to reject SWOC’s demands.
Girdler knew a strike was inevitable, so he
prepared. He anticipated violence and prior to the
beginning of the strike, Girdler ordered that each Republic
Steel plant be supplied with tear gas. This move showed his
hand. Girdler meant to break the strikers’ will and was
prepared to use force. He wrote that he instructed his staff
29
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to avoid violence but reminded them of their obligation to
protect Republic’s property and defend workers who
remained inside the facilities during a strike.32 Surely, he
knew that if his men used tear gas, then local authorities
would arrive and intervene on behalf of the city’s private
enterprise. In Youngstown, Niles, and Warren this was
exactly what happened.
Prior to the strike, SWOC distributed handbills as
workers left the plants. These papers served as recruitment
tools for SWOC.33 Newly recruited members then held
organizing meetings in homes, churches, and bars.34
Leaders were elected, and pickets were organized. SWOC
needed to operate in accordance with the Wagner Act. So,
in the months leading up to the strike, Lee Pressman,
SWOC’s lead legal counsel instructed membership to
record all violations of their rights.35
Once the strike was on, the union’s tactics became a
bit more questionable. SWOC and its members felt they
were engaged in an ideological and material war with
Republic Steel. To that end, they used whatever tactics
necessary to advance their cause. According to Tom
Girdler, the union needed to keep men who wanted to work
out of the plants. To accomplish this, Girdler wrote of the
strikers, “This was done by pickets carrying clubs, guns,
razors, and other weapons. Very few of these pickets were
Republic employees.”36 Whether Girdler’s claims are
accurate or not is difficult to confirm but the National
Labor Relations Board found that the union barred entry of
non-union workers into the plants.37 For the strike to work,
32
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SWOC needed Republic to feel economic pain. Their
method was to deny plants supplies and cease production. It
started to work.
As the strike began in Warren, men left at the end of
their shifts intending to begin picketing while also trying to
recruit others to their cause. Standing between them and
potential recruits, however, were the plant superintendent
and a couple hundred “loyal” workers and bosses armed
with sledgehammers, pikes and other weapons. The
superintendent shouted to them, “Come on you sons-ofbitches, we are waiting for you.” Another group trying to
leave the Warren facility also met resistance and were told,
“You have to stay here to protect your jobs… If you go
home you won’t have any more jobs in this department.”38
Republic Steel was clearly willing to resort to intimidation
and violence to maintain the status quo, but the CIO and its
members were likewise prepared to stand their ground.
On Saturday May 30th, 1937, SWOC leadership in
Ohio met with representatives for the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers. Steel mills connect to railroad lines
that deliver steel making materials and distribute the
finished product. Republic wanted to use their lines to
deliver food and other supplies to workers who remained
inside defying SWOC’s wishes. SWOC appealed to their
fraternal brothers in the Engineers union to convince them
not to make deliveries.39 Their efforts were somewhat
successful. In describing an exchange with the railroads,
Girdler wrote of the engineers’ commitments, “…we’ll
haul coal, iron ore, or finished steel as usual. But we won’t
haul munitions.” Those ‘munitions’ included food and
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clothing.40 The union needed the engineers’ help because
they could not hope to stop a locomotive physically. Mail
trucks, on the other hand, could not get through the human
picket lines around Ohio’s Republic facilities. Republic
authorities attempted to mail food into the plants from
Cleveland, but the union suspected the tactic and stopped
deliveries.41 With the situation becoming desperate,
Republic devised an ingenious solution to defeat the
SWOC siege.
Tom Girdler was an engineer by training, and he
attacked the siege problem like one. Girdler examined
Republic’s resources, assessed tactical success
probabilities, determined material cost and the cost to
Republic’s reputation, and decided on a course of action.
The Niles plant was in dire straits. Girdler’s leadership
team considered driving food near the plant, but they
abandoned that idea because strikers controlled all roads
around the facility. They considered using trains and mail,
but those methods had already been thwarted. Another
thought was to use a tank to deliver food, which Republic
had because they were contracted to provide armor and
needed to test steel on a working model. This was also
rejected because the Republic men decided it would lead to
bloodshed. Finally, they decided to try aerial resupply.42
Several Republic employees who owned airplanes
as well as private contractors were mobilized to drop food
into the plants. The Niles plant was the site of the first
attempt. It was off target and the strikers ended up with
supplies intended for workers in the plant. Subsequent
drops were successful, and the workers got food and
domestic supplies. Within a few days, workers inside the
Niles plant were able to fashion a makeshift runway that
Republic used to fly men and supplies in and out. The
40
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union also used planes to perform reconnaissance. The CIO
needed to know what work was ongoing and they used
planes to circle the plants and collect information.43 The
airplane strategy worked but it was not a long-term
solution. Steel making supplies could not get into the plants
and product could not get out. With both sides dug-in,
something had to give.
The strike languished for several more weeks into
the beginning of June 1937. Meanwhile, Republic tried to
gather support from law enforcement in cities where work
had stopped. On June 15th, Girdler distributed a statement
to employees that, in part, read, “Employees kept from their
jobs by mobs of armed pickets many of whom have never
worked for Republic and citizens outraged by this defiance
of law and decency by the C.I.O. are joining together to
insist that law enforcement agencies compel the union to
cease unlawful picketing.”44 While Girdler’s statement
reassured uninvolved employees, it also called for them to
pressure local authorities. Girdler tried to start a grassroots
campaign to benefit one of America’s most prosperous
companies. He wanted those on the sidelines to agitate for
local police and sheriff’s departments to enter the fray.
When fighting erupted in Youngstown the police and
sheriff’s deputies that were involved protected Republic’s
interests—not the workers.
There were only a few points of entry at Republic’s
Youngstown mill. This made it easy for strikers to control
the flow of people in and out of the mill. One of these
points was “Stop 5.” On the evening of Saturday, June
19th, 1937—three weeks into the strike—gunfire erupted,
and John Bogovich and James Eperjesi were killed outside
43
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the Republic plant in Youngstown.45 Accounts of the fight
report that at least 26 people were wounded, however the
actual number may have been upwards of 60. Dozens more
suffered the effects of tear gas.46 The community was
changed by this incident and divisions between labor and
management deepened. Both factions and bystanders saw
parts of their city damaged by disagreements between labor
and management. The costs of these confrontations were
materially high but the cost in human life and peace of
mind were even higher. The lives of those involved and
their loved ones changed forever.
Accounts of the events vary, and the genesis of
fighting is unclear. One account, purportedly from an
eyewitness, suggested that Youngstown police provoked
the incident. The eyewitness described a scene in which
women picketers arranged themselves for a photograph.
One had a camera and while others sat on folding chairs, a
Youngstown police officer snatched the camera from the
would-be photographer’s hands. Upon seeing this, the
photographer’s husband, who was nearby, tried to wrestle
the camera away from the police officer. Things escalated
quickly; the police lost control of themselves and the
situation. In contrast to others, this account stated that the
police opened fire with bullets as well as tear gas.47 This
account blamed the beginning of the battle on the police
and described them as a group of people itching for
confrontation. The account was sympathetic to SWOC and
saw its tactics as just. Others saw the beginning of the
encounter at Stop 5 differently.
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Newspaper reports of the event varied. The
Cleveland Plain Dealer was the largest daily publisher in
the immediate vicinity of Youngstown. Its reporting on the
opening salvos of the battle indicated that the women failed
to follow police instruction to move further from Republic
property. The Plain Dealer also identified them as the CIO
Women’s League. Because of their refusal to leave, the
police used three shells of tear gas. The crowd then
dispersed, reorganized and marched on police. The Plain
Dealer implied the melee began because the Women’s
League failed to comply.48 The language used in the Plain
Dealer article portrayed the strikers as wild and
uncontrollable. It mentioned no gunfire on the part of the
police and was specific about the number of tear gas shells
fired. The tone of the article painted authorities as ‘goodguys’ and the union as ‘bad-guys’. Likewise, when the
Chicago Daily Tribune summed up the evening’s events
seven days later its reporting cast the strikers in an
unfavorable light. The Tribune called the strikers “a wild
throng of enraged pickets.” The article did not indicate
strikers’ motivations, but it did, tellingly, call the CIO an
“all-powerful labor dictatorship.”49 This language
reinforced communist accusations leveled at the CIO.
Rather than reporting on the Youngstown strike, the
Tribune used their platform to advocate for Republic Steel,
authority, and the economic status-quo.
The chairman of Republic Steel was the most
extreme in blaming the CIO and SWOC for the violence. In
his autobiography, Boot Straps, Tom Girdler recounted the
events that started the strike. “As for the women, they were
anything but peaceful. They were, in fact, the same
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truculent, foul-mouthed type that Communist strategists
have used repeatedly to provoke a riot brawl with
policemen. And this riot was provoked. It had been
planned.”50 Girdler, although not present for the encounter,
described it in exhaustive detail. He claimed that the
women would not follow police instruction, spat at them,
and even cursed them—sometimes in a foreign language.
He also emphasized that the women sat on folding chairs
and boxes, which supposedly incited the police. In addition
to besmirching the character of the women, Girdler’s
account suggested that union agents waited just beyond the
vicinity of the female picketers so they could pounce if
there was trouble with the police. Girdler described the
Stop 5 incident as a coordinated tactical ploy designed by
SWOC, the CIO, and communists. In his mind, they used
underhanded tricks such as gender baiting and provocation
to pull the police into a confrontation they hoped to avoid.
A successful strike threatened to undermine Girdler’s
managerial ability and the union was beginning to outflank
him. Production slowed and local support, which he needed
to pressure workers into returning, was neutral. A union
instigated confrontation only benefited public opinion of
Girdler and Republic Steel.
Donald Sofchalk presented another depiction of the
Stop 5 incident in his 1961 dissertation examining the Little
Steel Strike. Sofchalk began his discussion of the Stop 5
incident by giving a detailed description of the terrain
involved. He also described Stop 5 as a bottleneck or choke
point into and out of the mill. Either side of the road at Stop
5 was bounded by a river or a railroad embankment. This
created an area controllable by anyone on the
embankment’s high ground—a veritable killing field. To
enter the facility, a person or vehicle had to go through an
underpass in the embankment. According to Sofchalk,
members of the Women’s League organized themselves on
50
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the sidewalks and the driveway near the underpass. One
issue with the protests on June 19th was that the women sat
in chairs and were not walking. This amounted to
provocation in the eyes of the police. An officer informed
the women they were obstructing traffic, the picket line
must be moving, and they could not sit. He gave them five
minutes to correct themselves and when they did not, he
discharged two or three tear gas grenades near the
picketing. After this, confusion reigned, and a full-blown
riot began.51 Sofchalk’s dissertation offered the most sober
assessment of the Youngstown riot. The events that ignited
violence that evening remain in dispute but what followed
later that night is certain—the lives of two people ended on
June 19th, 1937.
John Bogovich and James Eperjesi were shot to
death during the June 19th riot. The two victims that
eventful night, Bogovich and Eperjesi, were steelworkers,
European immigrants, and strikers. They worked together
at Youngstown Sheet and Tube—another steel company
involved in the Little Steel strike.52 The fact that they were
not Republic Steel employees but were present at the
incident is evidence that SWOC’s organization and
fraternal ties among workers were assets to the union’s
cause in Youngstown. Both Republic Steel and local law
enforcement opposed that cause. It is undetermined which
side fired the shots that killed Bogovich and Eperjesi. Like
the Stop 5 events that led to riot, competing versions of the
truth obscured the identities of Bogovich’s and Eperjesi’s
killers.
After the initial events at Stop 5, all sides agreed
that things escalated quickly but that is the limit to their
Donald Sofchalk, “The Little Steel Strike of 1937” (PhD diss., The
Ohio State University, 1961).
52
White, 158.
51

26

Spring 2021

agreement. Eyewitness testimony that appears favorable to
the union claims that machine gun fire erupted from the
“overhead cranes in the old tube mill.”53 This version
leaves no doubt that someone inside the mill fired on the
crowd. Girdler’s version contradicts this claim. He wrote,
“I am satisfied that no shots were fired by any of the more
than 800 men in our plant. They were mad that night. They
wanted to go out and go after the rioters. But all such talk
was discouraged and kept under control.”54 Not only did
Girdler justify the behavior of his company by absolving it
of any wrongdoing, he did so in a way that made him
appear to be in total control. When he said that he was
“satisfied,” Girdler’s words indicated that he was the
ultimate authority that arbitrated right and wrong at
Republic Steel. Furthermore, Girdler’s words betrayed his
attitude toward his employees. He portrayed them as people
of lesser emotional control who needed to be restrained. If
this is what he thought of employees loyal to Republic
during the strike, he must have believed worse about the
strikers.
John Bogovich was not initially involved with the
strike on June 19th. After hearing about what was unfolding
at the mill, Bogovich, like many other union members,
rushed to the scene. It is undetermined who fired the bullet
that killed Bogovich, but the anti-union forces seemed to be
using tactical methods. According to an interview of striker
Fred A. Fortunado, shooters inside the Republic mill
opened fire when flares were sent into the air. The flares
illuminated the scene and allowed gunmen to fire more
accurately.55 It was during one of these illuminated
moments that Bogovich was shot. Whether the fatal shot
came from the police, a Republic agent, or a union
53
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member, Bogovich was shot from distance. In contrast, a
point-blank shotgun blast killed James Eperjesi. Like
Bogovich, Eperjesi’s killer is unknown. Physical evidence
suggests that the fatal shot came from the direction of the
plant or the railroad embankment. Anti-union forces
occupied both locations. One witness claimed that sheriff’s
deputies shot Eperjesi from the back of a nearby truck and
that he was killed while he ran for cover.56
Most accounts of the deaths of John Bogovich and
James Eperjesi ran counter to Girdler’s claim that his men
fired no shots. His abdication of any Republic
responsibility was an exercise intended to salvage both the
reputations of himself and his company. The union, on the
other hand, tried to use the deaths as a source of inspiration.
At Bogovich’s funeral, a SWOC organizer named John
Stephens said, “Tom Girdler and Frank Purnell are
responsible for the death of this man, but his life has not
been taken in vain. The cornerstone of the union has been
cemented in his death.”57 The deaths of Bogovich and
Eperjesi on July 19th did little to change the attitudes of
SWOC, the CIO, and Republic Steel toward one other. It
took another four years and a War Labor Board order until
Republic Steel finally signed an agreement with the CIO.58
Conclusion
Two federal bodies, the National Labor Relations
Board and the Supreme Court of the United States both
released decisions that condemned the labor practices of
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Republic Steel during the 1930’s. First, in 1937, the
Supreme Court found the Wagner Act to be constitutional.
The CIO and SWOC based most of their organizing
strategy on the rights afforded to them by the Wagner
Act.59 This decision granted legitimacy to labor unions
across the country and served as a threat to companies like
Republic Steel. Then, in 1939 the NLRB found that
Republic Steel operated in a manner that violated the
Wagner Act by using intimidation tactics and dismissing
employees who tried to organize. Under the power granted
to it by the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board
ordered Republic Steel to compensate employees whom
they harmed financially or physically during the Little Steel
strike. The NLRB also reaffirmed the freedom to unionize
without molestation and required that workers fired for
union affiliation be re-hired. Furthermore, Republic Steel
had to report to the NLRB the steps it took to implement
their orders.60 Against the backdrop of Franklin Roosevelt’s
New Deal, federal entities began to make policy and
decisions that took power from corporations and placed
some in the hands of the working class. Labor
organizations took full advantage of the changing climate.
Some corporations resisted the winds of change. Where
resistance was strong, labor and management clashed, and
sometimes violence ensued. Republic Steel, led by one of
the most ardent opponents of labor rights, Tom Girdler,
resorted to violent means when no other option seemed
plausible.
Police justification for lethal violence is tenuous at
best, judging from available evidence. Accounts vary as to
the levels of danger law enforcement officers were in.
Judging the behavior of the female strikers and their
motivations is also difficult because of the difference in
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descriptions of that fateful evening. Nevertheless, for
laborers nationwide, a new era was emerging that promised
greater bottom-up influence in decision making to bring
better conditions, higher pay, and shorter hours. For
management, however, this upcoming labor-centric period
foretold an end to outright dominance over workers’ rights
and lives. When management’s fears of the future clashed
with labor’s hope, confrontation was inevitable. The degree
to which that confrontation escalated was dependent upon
the commitment that both sides gave to their ideals. In
Youngstown, on June 19th, 1937 those commitments ran
deep.
Historians have written very little about the conflict
at Republic Steel’s Youngstown operations, yet this event
nevertheless remains an important episode within the broad
arc of worker struggles in America. Republic Steel, albeit
less productive than “Big Steel” firms like U.S. Steel and
Bethlehem, was nonetheless an important component of the
latent American industrial power that played such a critical
role in the country’s ascendency to world economic
leadership. The strike, and subsequent status quo ante
bellum at the plant, likewise presaged an era of continued
antagonism between labor and capital that continues to this
day. Regardless, the Republic workers’ strike and the
violent aftermath in Youngstown, Ohio demonstrated an
important juncture in the long history of capitalist
exploitation of workers in the United States.

